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The revolutionary potential of the CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technique has created a resurgence in 
enthusiasm and concern in genetic research perhaps not seen since the mapping of the human 
genome at the turn of the century. Some such concerns and anxieties revolve around crossing lines 
between somatic and germline interventions as well as treatment and enhancement applications. 
Underpinning these concerns, there are familiar concepts of safety, unintended consequences, 
damage to genetic identity and the creation of designer children through pursuing human 
enhancement and eugenics. In the policy realm, these morally-laden distinctions and anxieties are 
emerging as the basis for making important and applied measures to respond to fast-evolving 
scientific developments. This paper argues that the dominant normative framing for such responses is 
insufficient for this task. This paper illustrates this insufficiency as arising from a continued reliance on 
misleading genetic essentialist assumptions that generate groundless speculation and over-
reactionary normative responses. This phenomenon is explicit with regard to prospective human 
(germline) genetic enhancements. While many normative theorists and state-of-the-art reports 
continue to gesture toward the influence of environmental and social influences on a person and their 
traits and capacities, this recognition does not extend to the substance of the arguments themselves 
which tend to revert to the debunked genetic determinist framework. Given the above, this paper 
argues that there is a pressing need for a more central role for sociological input into particular 
aspects of this enhancement myth in order to give added weight, detail and substance to these 






The revolutionary potential of the CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technique has created a 
resurgence in enthusiasm in genetic research perhaps not seen since the mapping of the 
human genome at the turn of the century. Understandably, it has also seen a resurgence in 
various concerns and caution. In particular, concern is most evident when certain familiar 
moral red-lines are, or are at risk of being, crossed, such as when genetic interventions move 
beyond somatic to the germline and therapeutic interventions move to enhancement. 
Underpinning these red-lines, there are equally familiar anxieties expressed over such issues 
from safety and unintended consequences to perceptions of damage to genetic identity and 
the creation of designer children through pursuing human enhancement and eugenics. In the 
policy realm, these morally-laden distinctions and anxieties are emerging as the basis for 
making important and applied measures to respond to fast-evolving scientific developments. 
The news of the gene-edited Chinese twins underlies this rapid progress as well as the 
pressing issue of developing adequate ELSI responses. However, while it is vital to develop 
guidance that is adapted to these rapid developments, it is also vital to ensure this guidance 
is robust and its supporting normative arguments are themselves critically scrutinised. In 
short, the focus should not just be on evaluating new technologies, but also continuously re-
assessing the normative arguments themselves – particularly when those arguments are both 
pervasive and highly reputable. 
This paper argues that the dominant normative framing for such arguments is insufficient for 
this task. As will be outlined below, it requires a crucial – oft noted yet oft ignored – revision 
for two interconnected reasons: to generate plausible empirically-grounded speculation of 
gene-editing technological possibilities in order to generate the appropriate and proportional 
ELSI and normative responses. This paper illustrates this insufficiency as arising from a 
continued reliance on misleading genetic essentialist assumptions that generate groundless 
speculation and over-reactionary normative responses.1 This phenomenon is particularly 
 
1 Habermas, Jürgen (2003) The Future of Human Nature ; Sandel, Michael J. (2007) The Case Against 
Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press; Greenfield, Andy et al. (2016) Genome editing: an ethical review. Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics; Charo, R. Alta, Hynes, Richard O. et al. (2017) Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, And 
Governance. Committee on Human Gene Editing: Scientific, Medical, and Ethical Considerations. A Report of 
National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Medicine. Washington, DC: The National Academies 
Press; European Academies Science Advisory Council (2017) Genome editing: scientific opportunities, public 
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explicit in the normative responses with regard to prospective human (germline) genetic 
enhancement and therefore this will be the focus of the paper.2 While many normative 
theorists and state-of-the-art reports continue to gesture toward the influence of 
environmental and social influences on a person and their traits and capacities, this 
recognition does not extend to the substance of the arguments themselves which tend to 
revert to the debunked genetic determinist framework. While it will be noted that there are 
recent moves in this direction, it will be noted that such moves have yet to reframe this 
normative debate.3 Given the above, this paper argues that there is a pressing need for a 
more central role for sociological input into particular aspects of this enhancement debate in 
order to give added weight, detail and substance to these environmental influences and 
influence from social structures.  
 
THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF ENHANCEMENTS 
From the Human Genome Project to the immediately prior to the discovery of the improved 
CRISPR method of gene-editing, there has been much work done in terms of genetic 
sequencing and genetic testing, particularly due to the emergence and expansion of direct-
to-customer testing companies.4 On the other hand, there has been less success in terms of 
successful and viable genetic interventions and applications, particularly in the context of 
human therapeutics.5 The two dominant methods of gene-editing during this period consisted 
of finger nucleases2 (ZFNs) and Transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENS)6. In 
both cases, the processes have been complex, expensive, inefficient, time-consuming and 
generating low success in results.7 The progress since Emmanuelle Charpentier and Jennifer 
 
interests and policy options in the European Union. EASAC Policy Report 31. German National Academy of 
Sciences Leopoldina.  
2 Other potential applications of genetic or genome editing technologies would be relevant for a wider focus.   
3 Yeung, Karen (2018) Genome editing and human reproduction: social and ethical issues. Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics; Freese, Jeremy & Shostak, Sara (2009) ‘Genetics and Social Inquiry’ Annual Review of Sociology, 
Vol. 35:107-128 (August 2009). 
4 Borry, Pascal, Cornel Martina C. & Howard, Heidi C. (2010) ‘Where are you going, where have you been: a 
recent history of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing market’. Journal of Community Genetics 1:101–106 
5 Emmert-Streib, Frank, Dehmer, Matthias & Yli-Harja, Olli (2017) ‘Lessons from the Human Genome Project: 
Modesty, Honesty, and Realism.’ Frontiers in genetics Vol. 8 184. (Nov. 2017). 
6  Gaj, Thomas., Gersbach, Charles A. & Barbas, Carlos F., 3rd (2013). ‘ZFN, TALEN, and CRISPR/Cas-based 
methods for genome engineering’. Trends in biotechnology, 31(7), 397–405.  
7  ibid 
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Doudna’s 2012 publication on the possibility of reprogramming the viral defence mechanism 
of bacteria to create precise changes to any sequence of DNA, in any cell, has been 
significant.8 CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats), or rather 
CRISPR-Cas9, has raised the possibility of making genetic changes to human and non-human 
targets a much more realistic, and immediate, goal. In short, it is cheaper, easier, more 
accurate, efficient than previous methods (although such previous methods are still being 
further developed) and can be directed toward making any changes, to any sequence of DNA 
– whether to delete or silence an existing sequence or to insert a new one.9 The method can 
be applied to making somatic changes but also germline changes, which raises the increased 
prospect of affecting future generations.10 To underlie this revolutionary advance in technical 
capacities, it only took less than six more years to come to a point where the first confirmed 
cases of humans were born with their heritable genetic constitution gene-edited using 
CRISPR-Cas9.11 Dr Jiankui He's germ-line reproductive gene-editing of twin girls (with a HIV-
infected father and unaffected mother) consisted of inserting a variant of the CCR5 gene to 
confer immunity to HIV. The case was significant for a number of reasons and not just because 
of the apparent technical feat that it represented.12 While technical limitations regarding the 
possibility of successfully intervening on the germline with successful births was one factor, 
the more fundamental factors were the ethical and legal safeguards that were ignored in the 
process.13 It may be some months or years before it can be known what possible side-effects 
will face the twin girls from a variety of unknown – and currently unknowable – changes that 
may have been caused and have yet to manifest. 
Initial reactions to the He-Case 
Directly upon the announcement, there were a number of reactions from the academic, 
scientific, policy-making and wider communities. These reactions could be broadly divided 
 
8 Jinek, Martin, Chylinski, Krzysztof, Fonfara, Ines, Hauer, Michael, Doudna, Jennifer A. & Charpentier, 
Emmanuelle (2012) ‘A Programmable Dual-RNA–Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive Bacterial Immunity’ 
Science, Vol. 337 (August 2012). 
9 ibid 
10 Lanphier, Edward, Urnov, Fyodor, Haecker, Sarah E., Werner, Michael, Smolenski, Joanna (2015) ‘Don’t 
edit the human germ line’ Nature Vol. 519 (March 2015). 
11 Cyranoski, David (2019) ‘The CRISPR-baby scandal: what’s next for human gene-editing’ Nature 566 





into two distinct types. Firstly, there were, what I call, general bioethical reactions (A), some 
of which were along the following lines: 
I. ‘safety concerns’ 
II. ‘lack of medical necessity’ 
III. ‘possibility of off-target mutations and mosaicism’ 
IV. ‘reckless experimentation’ 
V. ‘questionable informed consent process’ 
VI. ‘lack of transparency’ 
VII. ‘inadequate regulation and oversight’14 
In addition to the above reactions, there was another important aspect to the case that 
generated another series of enhancement-specific reactions. While the germline intervention 
was ostensibly health-related, it was not, strictly-speaking, a treatment, but rather an 
enhancement.  While there is a variant of the CCR5 gene that provides the bearer with 
resistance to HIV infection, this is rare in the human population under normal circumstances. 
As it was not present in the case of the twins that He intervened on, it was a case of making 
a modification that brought about something that was beyond the normal state. The intended 
enhancement was to bring about disease prevention that does not commonly exist. In many 
cases, such disease-preventing enhancements would inhabit a grey area between treatments 
and enhancements usually understood. For greater precision, it could be stated that there are 
two concepts of enhancement. Disease preventing enhancements are, what Stephen 
Wilkinson calls, ‘super-normality’ enhancements because they improve upon what is normal 
while still focussed on the broad medical goal of preventing disease. 15 These would be distinct 
from ‘non-disease avoidance’ enhancements which would be focussed on improvements that 
are unrelated to disease, focussing on traits already within the normal range.16. Ultimately, 
 
14 Park, Alice (2018) ‘“They Will Be Studied for the Rest of Their Lives.” How China's Gene-Edited Twins 
Could Be Forever Changed By Controversial CRISPR Work’ TIME 29 Nov. 2018. Available at: 
http://time.com/5466967/crispr-twins-lives/ [last accessed – 29/03/19]; Cyranoski, David & Ledford, Heidi 
(2018) ‘Genome-edited baby claim provokes international outcry’ Nature 26 Nov. 2018. Available at: 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07545-0 [last accessed – 29/03/19]; Davies, Kevin (2018) ‘Under 
Fire, He Jiankui Defends Germline Editing Study’ GEN: Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News 28 Nov. 
2018. Available at: https://www.genengnews.com/insights/under-fire-he-jiankui-defends-germline-editing-
study/ [Last accessed: 29/03/2019]. 
15 See Wilkinson, Stephen. 2010. Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: The Ethics of Selective Reproduction. 




while at the less controversial end of the enhancement spectrum, super-normality 
interventions that are disease-related  are enhancements. As a consequence, in addition to – 
and distinct from – the above reactions, there was a number of other ‘enhancement-specific’ 
responses that I call reactions (B), which would be held by some in addition to reactions (A). 
Some of these were as follows: 
I. Arthur Caplan: “taking a step down the road of eugenics"17 
II. Marcy Darnovsky: "Throwing open the door to a society of genetic haves and have-
nots [that] undermines our chances for a fair and just future.”18 
III. Craig Klugman: "The film GATTACA turned 20 years old this year...a couple visits their 
local neighborhood geneticist and orders up their child, choosing the most favorable 
genes as well as some tweaks to avoid common diseases. That scene took one step 
closer to reality..."19 
While any mention of enhancement seems to increase moral unease for some, it should be 
noted that there could also be a further unintended enhancement that is much deeper into 
the controversial end of enhancements. It has been observed that CCR5-edited mice are 
correlated with enhanced cognitive functioning.20 While observations in mice does not simply 
translate to humans, there is still a possibility that the twin-girls will have had a modification 
that is, at least possibly, a cognitive enhancement of some degree, or a step in that direction. 
Taking this onboard, it would further sharpen the criticisms and concerns already expressed 
in the reactions (B) and would be subject to negative assessments from a number of 
conventions, declarations, guidelines and regulations. For instance, in 2015, the UNESCO's 




bioethics-policy [Last accessed: 29/03/2019]. 
18 See: https://www.geneticsandsociety.org/press-statement/claim-genetically-modified-babies-if-true-grave-
abuse-human-rights [Last accessed: 29/03/2019]. 
19 See: http://www.bioethics.net/2018/11/birth-of-twins-from-embryo-editing-raise-ethical-legal-and-social-
issues/ [Last accessed: 29/03/2019]. 




rapid advances in genetics are making “designer babies” an increasing possibility 
[with] the power of science to modify genetically human embryos in the laboratory, 
so as to control inherited traits, such as appearance and intelligence.21 
The case of the possible unintended enhancement here can be related to some potentially 
unavoidable problems facing any stance that seeks to permit and promote interventions that 
can be classified as treatments (or even disease-preventing enhancements) while seeking to 
prohibit interventions that can be classified as unambiguous enhancements. The notion of 
the effective unavoidability of enhancement has been raised by Eric T. Juengst et al. in a paper 
on the issue of ‘incidental enhancements’.22 This is where a treatment for a given disease or 
disability can also be an intervention that brings about enhancing side-effects. For instance, 
there may be enhanced cognition 'side-effects' from Alzheimer's disease research. In such 
cases, the treatment (or 'prevention to disease' focus) "would raise the same worries about 
competitive advantages, equality of access, authentic agency..." and so on.23 One particular 
area where this would seem prevalent is in the case of aging-related interventions. A key 
concern noted here would be the possible regulatory restrictions that may affect 
interventions for treatments (that are themselves uncontroversial and valuable), when these 
treatments could also bring about enhancements, or have enhancing effects.  
Council of Europe’s Recommendation as an Example 
For instance, this risk can be seen if we look at the wording of the Council of Europe’s 
Recommendation 2115 (2017) on the use of new genetic – specifically including genome 
editing – technologies in human beings where it reaffirmed the opposition to deliberate 
germline editing as expressed in the ‘Oviedo Convention’ as crossing “a line viewed as 
ethically inviolable”.24 While it is unlikely that they expected ‘quite soon’ to be as soon as it 
was, the authors of the Recommendation recognised that: 
recent advances in genome editing are bound to result in germline interventions in 




22 Juengst Eric T. Henderson Gail E. Walker Rebecca L. Conley John M. MacKay Douglas Meagher Karen M. 
Saylor Katherine Waltz Margaret Kuczynski Kristine J. Cadigan R. Jean (2018) ‘Is Enhancement the Price of 





been altered with some unforeseeable consequences in such a way that their 
descendants are also affected.25  
In other words, while not universally supported, germline interventions were increasingly 
perceived to be sufficiently realisable to be of imminent concern. As can be seen in the 
following passage, it is not only germline, but enhancements that come in for specific concern: 
Recent discoveries related to the human genome [...] raises complex ethical and 
human rights questions, including – but not limited to – unintended harm which may 
result from the techniques used, access and consent to such techniques, and their 
potential abuse for enhancement or eugenic purposes.26 
The final sentence is very telling: the ‘potential abuse for enhancement or eugenic purposes’ 
of such gene-editing techniques. To highlight this, compare the following two sentences: 
“their potential abuse for enhancement or eugenic purposes” (CoE original) and ‘the potential 
for enhancement purposes, including potential abuse for risky, or unsafe, or uncertain, or 
controversial, or harmful enhancement purposes’ (my alternative wording). In ‘my alternative 
wording’, there can be abuse for enhancement purposes, but it is not necessarily, not 
intrinsically, the case. In the original sentence that the Council of Europe uses, the abuse is 
intrinsic to any application for enhancement purposes, no matter what. It is also notable that 
the concept of ‘enhancement’ is grouped so closely to the concept of ‘eugenics’. This 
normative overreaction is something that needs to be firmly addressed by proponents of a 
properly regulated application of enhancements. In a similar sense, the concern over disease 
prevention research efforts being penalised by policy concerns about enhancement or 
'incidental enhancements' would seem to be set to become a crucial focus on enhancement 
discussion in the years ahead.  
 
Accordingly, the issue of how ‘enhancement’ has been seen, and how it should be seen, in 
terms of the general bioethical issues normally raised and as noted in such reactions (B) 
above, will be the focus of the rest of the paper. The reactions (A) noted above are related to 
more basic and self-evident issues that are not in question and are accepted throughout the 






some of the force of concern that they exhibit may have at least some basis in a persisting 
normative misunderstanding of the science of genetics. When the potential of genetic 
interventions was more modest, the potential of enhancements largely remained the stuff of 
science fiction, useful as a though-experiment for various normative arguments, but unlikely 
to have any real impact given the actual slow progress of genetic interventions. CRISPR-Cas9 
has enabled a dramatic increase in the pace of discovery and of the potential of future genetic 
interventions. In turn, normative arguments and their underlying framing of how genetic 
interventions (such as enhancements) work, will increasingly have real-world impacts.  
 
 
THE MYTH OF ENHANCEMENT 
 
Over the last number of decades, there has been a growing literature on the potential ethical 
and social justice concerns of the use of new genetic technologies for enhancement purposes, 
particularly with regard to germline enhancements (e.g. Kass, Habermas, Sandel and 
Melmann). Throughout most of this time, the prospect of enhancement as a technical 
possibility seemed remote and, to some extent, close to – or fully within – the realm of science 
fiction. While the technical prospects have changed considerably in recent years, the 
dominant normative arguments still rely upon the same quasi-scientific genetic essentialist 
assumptions which remain central to the formation of the normative framework in which the 
assessment of enhancements still takes place. In other words, to borrow a phrase from 
comparative literature, there has been a myth built up over the years in the normative 
literature about what enhancements will entail in terms of the likely type and degree of 
changes to the individual, the family and to broader society. This has consequences for the 
degree of ethical concerns that arise and the ELSI responses that emerge. Using the term 
‘myth’ is not to suggest that enhancements themselves are not real and would not have 
significant individual and social impact. The term ‘myth’ is used against the image of 
enhancements that has been built with a debunked genetic determinist framework. I call it a 
myth as it is an overly constructed fiction without sufficient empirical basis. This is not a 
criticism of bioethical speculation nor is it a criticism of approaches in anticipatory governance 
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or forecasting.27 Those are important and necessary approaches when dealing with novel 
emerging technologies with uncertain technical and ELSI trajectories. Indeed, this is what is 
advocated in this paper. However, it is important to note that these approaches usefully 
speculate upon what might be, by basing their starting point from what is already known to 
be. What is empirically known offers a framework for the speculation of the ‘more plausible’ 
unknowns and for the associated ELSI and normative recommendations to be more 
appropriate, proportional and responsible. For instance, to take a fanciful example, if a pill 
instantly made someone immortal, all-powerful and easily morally corruptible, it would be 
appropriate to target this form of intervention, and proportional to prohibit all research to 
this end and it would be acting responsibly to ethically support (for instance) prohibition even 
if many other possible goods were thereby forgone in the cessation of associated research. 
On the contrary, it would be irresponsible to permit such research and such applications if an 
evil Übermensch was the likely consequence.28 While the myth of enhancement does not 
necessarily, or always, go to such extremes, I contend that many of the prominent normative 
approaches have an unhelpful tendency in that direction. This is also not just a case of it 
arising in literature that is on the fringes of academia and scientific commentary. It can be 
seen arising in a number of high-level reports that have been drafted to respond to the advent 
of CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing.  
 
Before examining this issue in more detail below, it may be useful to give a brief summary of 
the main concepts and arguments arising in three recent and major reports on genome 
editing, with a focus here on human (germline) enhancements. In the 2016 Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics ‘Genome editing: an ethical review’ Report, it is noted that “[m]any of the 
questions that arise in respect of the use of genome editing beyond treatment and (arguably 
also) prevention of disease [i.e. enhancement] are not new and have been raised in relation 
to gene therapy and embryo selection following PGD”.29 The key issues raised include the 
standard treatment/enhancement distinction, slippery slope concerns, consumerisation of 
human biology, liberal eugenics, problematic interference with personal identity as well as 
 
27 Scott, Christopher Thomas & Selin, Cynthia (2019) ‘What to Expect When Expecting CRISPR Baby Number 
Four’, The American Journal of Bioethics, 19:3, 7-9, 
28 Friedrich Nietzsche (1883) Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
29 Greenfield, Andy et al. (2016) Genome editing: an ethical review. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, p.51 
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other well-known concepts and arguments from the established normative literature.30 In 
each case, these key issues, and underlying normative arguments, rest on the assumption 
that the genetic is playing a crucial, dominant role, without highlighting what the equivalent 
environmental or social role would be.31 While noting some issues of exceptionalism of 
genetic choices and also what counts as ‘normal’, there is considerably less focus on this as 
opposed to the aforementioned arguments.32 Throughout, there is very little focus on any 
pro-enhancement positions (apart from briefly noting arguments from transhumanists or 
from approaches that see future enhancements as potentially necessary to respond to 
environment/climate change).33 Overall, the enhancement discussion remains relatively 
intact from the pre-CRISPR normative literature where, in the main, enhancement is seen as 
particularly ‘special’ with regard to the type and degree of impact and associated normative 
concerns and responses.  
 
Similarly, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine’s 2017 ‘Human 
Genome Editing: Science, Ethics & Governance’ Report notes that enhancements are 
characterised as spanning a normative spectrum from the ‘mundane to the dangerous and 
problematic’.34 This disposition is reflected in the 2016 Pew study of surveys where they 
observe that enhancements generate ‘more anxiety than enthusiasm’.35 Throughout, familiar 
pre-CRISPR concerns from unfairness, inauthenticity, eugenics and mastery are raised on the 
assumption of the crucial, dominant role genetic interventions would make, above what 
equivalent interventions (to the same or similar ends) would do in the environmental or social 
context.36 The treatment/enhancement distinction is supported as being fundamentally 
sound, albeit not perfect, and useful, with modifications to include vaccine-like 
interventions.37 While they note that, if safety and other similar concerns are overcome, there 
 
30 ibid, pp. 28, 51-53. 
31 In terms of the basic science elsewhere in the report, the environment is discussed with regard to the 
relationship between genome and phenotype. However, this basic assumption is not applied to the normative 
discussion. 
32 ibid, p.28 
33 ibid, p.51 
34 Charo, R. Alta, Hynes, Richard O. et al. (2017) Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, And Governance. 
Committee on Human Gene Editing: Scientific, Medical, and Ethical Considerations. A Report of National 







could be less objection to the application of the technology for enhancement purposes, the 
aforementioned societal concerns (from unfairness to mastery) would still remain to be 
overcome.38 In this report, there is also scant attention devoted to any pro-enhancement 
positions (again, briefly noting transhumanists & environment/climate change).39  
 
Finally, in the 2017 European Academies' Science Advisory Council Report, human application 
is only one of the many applications evaluated (the rest including agricultural applications, 
gene-drives and so on).40 Nevertheless, it is still notable that the only mentions of 
enhancement applications are related to a fear of increasing social inequalities and an unclear 
statement on how they be used coercively (whether this means people would be coerced into 
using enhancements due to social or other pressures, or that future generations would be 
coerced by having interventions done upon them, prior to their ability to give consent).41 In 
this report, the Genetic Alliance UK survey is referred to in highlighting that most respondents 
continue to rely on the treatment-enhancement distinction, while not favouring the 
enhancement side.42 Overall, there is no pro-enhancement stance taken. 
 
None of the three Reports contain anything much by way of positive discussion of 
enhancement but many negative points, influenced by the now very familiar normative 
discussions (as cited throughout the reports).43 This is not necessarily calling for a pro-
enhancement position from such reports, all things considered. Nor, of course given the focus 
of the reports, is it to question the obvious emphasis on the role of genetics and the normative 
assessment of genetic interventions. However, as will be detailed in the following section, the 
issue of imbalance arises where this genetic emphasis does not include, at its core, the 
 
38 ibid 
39 ibid  
40 European Academies Science Advisory Council (2017) Genome editing: scientific opportunities, public 
interests and policy options in the European Union. EASAC Policy Report 31. German National Academy of 
Sciences Leopoldina. Ch.5. 
41 ibid 
42 ibid 
43 In discussions of enhancements, it should be noted that there can be different interpretations on what is meant 
by ‘enhancement’ – some modest improvements in certain capabilities, while others can be more extensive. A 
more nuanced approach – as this paper seeks to move the debate toward –  would not seek to approve or prohibit 
‘enhancements’ per se, but would give different normative assessments to different forms of enhancement 
depending on the effects on the resulting people and on society in general.      
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equivalent emphasis of environmental or social influences in its normative assessment of 
genetic interventions, such as (germline) enhancement.   
 
 
CHARTING NEW WATERS WITH OLD SHIPS? 
 
A key influence from earlier normative discussions, that continues to be significantly 
highlighted in such reports, is the treatment-enhancement distinction that, with some minor 
‘disease prevention’ modifications, remains pretty much as noted by Kass et al. in the 2003 
Beyond Therapy, Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness report: 
 
Where the goal is restoring health, the doctor’s discretion is guided by an agreed-upon 
and recognizable target. But a physician prescribing for goals beyond therapy is in 
uncharted waters. Although fully armed with the means, he has no special expertise 
regarding the end—neither what it is nor whether it is desirable [and is] ungoverned 
by any deep ethical norms (304).44 
 
Other key concerns raised in the reports also have links to earlier discussions that have 
highlighted various ways that enhancements are problematic in a way that treatments are 
not. Habermas (2003) for instance, is particularly concerned over the unfreedom that any 
enhanced offspring will experience due to the (irreversible) design by third parties and the 
prevention of being the undivided author of one’s own life.45 Sandel (2007) focus is on the 
motivations and character of parents who would seek enhancements for their future 
offspring.46 It would, he argues, be the result of a negative character trait that strives for total 
mastery over one’s offspring.47 The problem is that these, and the many other normative 
arguments, share an underlying genetic essentialist, or genetic determinist, assumption that 
frames the entire normative discussion.48 While the science of genetics, and genetic 
interventions, does not subscribe to any such assumption, the downplaying of the role of the 
 
44 Kass, Leon R., et al. (2003), Beyond Therapy, Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington DC: 
Report by the President’s Council on Bioethics). 
45 Habermas, Jürgen (2003) The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
46 Sandel Michael J. (2007) The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. Cambridge 
(MA): Belknap Press. 
47 ibid 
48 Resnik, D & Vorhaus D (2006) ‘Genetic modification and genetic determinism’ Philosophy, Ethics, and 
Humanities in Medicine 1:9 
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environment as an essential and equally important factor in the formation of the human (and 
more so, the social environment formation of the socialised human) is a puzzling but common 
theme in the normative discussions that dominated the pre-CRISPR context. This underlying 
framing takes the following form: 
 
Natural pre-child genetic ‘potential’ followed by the (‘in the world’) guidance of the 
child’s lived experience (pre-genetic intervention context) 
 
which is replaced with: 
 
Natural pre-child genetic ‘potential’ [and then unprecedented artificial outside 
(genetic) influence instead of person’s own negotiation of the world and its 
opportunities and obstacles (family, peers, schooling, etc)] followed by the (‘in the 
world’) guidance of the child’s lived experience (with whatever range of options 
remain) (traditional genetic enhancement context)  
 
A seemingly obvious point seems oddly missed regarding the fundamental influence that the 
environment – specifically the social and parental environment – has, or should have, in the 
above equation. It is well established from an interactionist perspective, as Susan C. South & 
Robert F. Krueger note, that the so-called nature versus nurture debate has been replaced 
with the wider appreciation on how both influences make fundamental contributions to 
variation in human personality.49 More broadly, epigenetics has also highlighted ‘an 
important bridge’ between life experiences and phenotypes by the environmental influences 
on gene expression.50 More broadly still, Allen Buchanan dismisses objections that argue that 
genetic enhancements causing changes ‘in us’ are fundamentally different from ‘external’ or 
‘environmental’ enhancements. It would be, he continues, “tantamount to denying that 
culture plays a significant role in our individual and collective identities”.51 These external or 
environmental enhancements are not avoidable, nor are they less profound than our genetic 
 
49 South, S. C., & Krueger, R. F. (2008). An interactionist perspective on genetic and environmental 
contributions to personality. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(2), 929-948. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00062.x 
50 Tammen, Stephanie. A., Friso, Simonetta., & Choi, Sang-Woon. W. (2013). Epigenetics: the link between 
nature and nurture. Molecular aspects of medicine, 34(4), 753–764. doi:10.1016/j.mam.2012.07.018 
51 Buchanan, Allen (2011) Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement OUP: Oxford. p.39 
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influences.52 We do not just emerge into social structures but we emerge out of them, for 
instance the physical social environment (urban environment, school)53; the cultural social 
environment (socialisation of norms, values54); the learning social environment (degree and 
type of sensory stimulation promotes and shapes cognitive development, creating and 
shaping neural pathways in the brain55); the emotional social environment (shapes identity, 
personality56) and combinations of all the above and more.57 If we speak of the issue of 
irreversible effects of genetic design, this is not just a feature of genetic interventions but 
socio-environmental ones too. While the effects of a particular social intervention or 
influence may be reversible, does not mean that they all can. At least, not without the person 
essentially becoming a different person (although numerically continuous).58 Nor need the 
effects (as opposed to the changes to the DNA itself) of genetic design be less irreversible. 
Like environmental and social design, some may and some may not.59 The problem facing 
such normative discussions that rely on assumptions that downplay this artificial 
environmental influence is that it thereby treats as entirely unprecedented the artificial 
genetic influences that may be possible with interventions termed as enhancements. This is 
not a new criticism, rather one that has, hitherto, not been sufficiently heeded. Resnik and 
 
52 Bearman, Peter (eds)(2008) ‘Exploring Genetics and Social Structure’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
114, supplement; Giddens, Anthony, (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
53 Macionis, John J. (2013). Sociology (15th ed.). Boston: Pearson 
54 Bouissou, Christine & Tap, Pierre (1998). Parental education and socialisation of the child: internality, 
valorisation and self-positioning. European Journal of Psychology of Education, Springer Verlag, vol 
XIII (n°4), pp.475-484. 
55 Woollett, Katherine, & Maguire, Eleanor. A. (2011). ‘Acquiring "the Knowledge" of London's layout drives 
structural brain changes’. Current biology 21(24), 2109–2114. 
56 Macionis, John J. (2013). Sociology (15th ed.). Boston: Pearson; Bouissou, Christine & Tap, Pierre (1998). 
Parental education and socialisation of the child: internality, valorisation and self-positioning. European Journal 
of Psychology of Education, Springer Verlag, vol. XIII (n°4), pp.475-484; Hertzman C. Putting the concept of 
biological embedding in historical perspective. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America. 2012;109(Suppl. 2):17160–17167 
57 Macionis, John J. (2013). Sociology (15th ed.). Boston: Pearson; Macionis, John J., & Gerber, Linda M. 
(2011) Sociology. Toronto: Pearson Canada. 
58 Parfit, Derek, (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
59 It should be noted that none of this is to suggest that genetic factors can never have an impact independently 
from the social environment. For instance, the disease caused by the autosomal dominant mutation in the 
Huntingtin gene does not require socio-environmental factors to occur. It is also not to say that genetic 
interventions necessarily have a weaker, short-lasting and easily reversible impact on future generations than 
social interventions. This may or may not be the case depending on the level of gene-environmental interactions 
involved, e.g. intelligence and personality interventions within the normal range. This would be more evident if 
one takes the aforementioned interactionist perspective for instance. It is also important to note that when one 
states that genetic interventions have a stronger, longer lasting and less reversible impact, this is referring to the 
changes to DNA and not necessarily to the phenotypic effects of those changes. On this last point, see Yeung, 




Vorhaus (2006) previously argued that some of the well-known objections to human genetic 
modification of human beings rely heavily on genetic determinist assumptions “despite 
conclusive evidence to the contrary”.60 Contra Habermas (to return to the example above) 
we have never been the sole undivided author of our lives, but we just continue to write new 
pages. The ethical concerns that are speculated to arise from the use of genetic 
enhancements should therefore be considered as concerns from some potential applications 
or forms of genetic enhancements, and not of genetic enhancements per se. Whether social 
or genetic, some degree of co-authorship is to be expected and thereby normatively 
acceptable – this would still hold excessive authorship from parents or others to be still a bad 
thing. Similar responses can be put toward mastery objections, cheating, and so on. As Resnik 
and Vorhaus notes:  
 
a genetically modified person may be a passive subject in the development of certain 
traits, such as eye color or skin color, he or she must take an active role in the 
development of most traits in which authenticity might be any concern, such as 
intelligence, athletic ability, social skills, or musical ability.61 
 
What should be added to Resnik and Vorhaus’ comment here is another fundamental source 
of development – namely the social-environmental role – that would have an impact upon a 
continuum within which the individual can be regarded as passive subject (e.g. early 
socialisation) to active agent. Some balance between treating the individual as passible 
subject and active agent is unavoidable and morally required in raising children and, 
sometimes, whether due to excessive parenting or cultural control, the stage of passive 
subject can be too pervasive. Nevertheless, that there are bad applications of social 
interventions, does not count against social intervention per se. This point is similar to Agar’s 
‘Nurture Principle’ (holding that genetic interventions are as permissible as the environmental 
interventions, where the goal is the same).62 However, rather than simply a thought 
experiment or intuitive assumption, it is something that is the subject of a longstanding 
analysis and conceptualisation by the social sciences, and therefore should be supported as 
such. The expertise that Kass’s physician lacks does indeed need to be developed in order for 
 
60 Resnik, D & Vorhaus D (2006) ‘Genetic modification and genetic determinism’ Philosophy, Ethics, and 
Humanities in Medicine 1:9 
61 ibid 
62 Agar, Nicholas, (2004) Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (Oxford: Blackwell). 
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adequate normative guidance and a suggestion here would be to incorporate the insight from 
social scientists to this end. While Resnik and Vorhaus correctly diagnosed the problem where 
the normative reactions to genetic modification was based on false genetic determinist 
assumptions, their constructive suggestion was open and without specification. In short, the 
promising role of sociological insight was insufficiently mapped out. 
 
 
REFRAMING THE ENHANCEMENT DISCUSSION WITH SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT 
 
As in the case of the pre-CRISPR normative literature, sociological insight continues to be 
insufficiently included. This can be seen in the three reports noted above. In the case of the 
2017 EASAC report, there is no sociological input, bar an expressed ‘hope’ for future social 
consensus and a mention of needed engagement with the social sciences, but only for public 
engagement strategies.63 In the 2016 Nuffield report, there is scant mention of socially 
constructed view of normality (in the context of defining disability), and nothing significant 
on enhancement itself.64 Throughout, there is no mention of social structures ‘co-creating’ 
the phenotype (i.e. that which ultimately matters – the resulting person). Similarly, in the 
2017 NASEM report, there is a brief mention of socially constructed view of normality with 
regard to the insight from disability perspectives.65 While there is some mention of non-
genetic enhancements examples (e.g. coffee), these are few and minor and there is no 
discussion of the notion of social structures ‘co-creating’ the person.66 It should be noted that 
there is a brief objection against Sandel’s mastery point with regard to the speculative nature 
of such fears and the parameters already allowed to parents, but without any significant 
development and without sociological input.67 As Wilkinson (2010) had previously argued 
against Sandel, while it may be speculated that such attitudes exist in prospective parents, 
the concern that they would spill over into their attitudes when they are actual parents is a 
 
63 European Academies Science Advisory Council (2017) Genome editing: scientific opportunities, public 
interests and policy options in the European Union. EASAC Policy Report 31. German National Academy of 
Sciences Leopoldina. Ch.5. 
64 Greenfield, Andy et al. (2016) Genome editing: an ethical review. Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 
65 Charo, R. Alta, Hynes, Richard O. et al. (2017) Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, And Governance. 
Committee on Human Gene Editing: Scientific, Medical, and Ethical Considerations. A Report of National 





mere possibility largely based on conjecture without empirical evidence.68 More 
fundamentally, as Corrigan (2009) notes, the concerns of Habermas (and others), while widely 
debated, rely on a view that presupposes “a biological essence to human identity, and as such 
they contravene many contemporary concepts based on the ‘social construction’ of the 
body”.69 In such reports, it is problematic that such conjectures and presuppositions are not 
further challenged (in the strongest terms) with regard to levels of empirical evidence (or lack 
thereof) and alongside a more central inclusion of the social constructionist framing of the 
body. It is not just a case of some papers or commentaries from some authors propounding 
such conjectures, but reports that profess to highlight the state-of-the-art in terms of the 
relevant normative literature.  
 
In a more recent Report from the Nuffield Council (2018), there is a genuine change of tone 
in the fundamental assumptions underlying the dominant normative arguments (including 
making space for a change to the aforementioned enhancement myth).70  The report 
questions why genomic interventions are considered exceptional when compared to other 
parental interventions such as education and inculcating the moral conscience, highlighting 
the belief of changes ‘indelibly inscribed into a future person’s biology’ even where the actual 
effects are of lesser magnitude.71 Recalling Habermas’s aforementioned concerns, the report 
notes it as “bordering on genetic determinism [and] exceptionalist in the sense that it treats 
genetic factors as radically more important than other constraints that parents might 
apply”.72 So far, as evidenced here and elsewhere in the 2018 Nuffield Report, this change in 
direction is more the exception in the overall normative state-of-the-art, but it is a promising 
step that such reframing is in progress.  Of course, none of this is not to argue that genetic 
essentialism should be replaced by the pure social constructionism, but rather that they 
cannot be separated with one side ignored or downplayed.  Overall, this argument posits that 
 
68 Wilkinson, Stephen. 2010. Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: The Ethics of Selective Reproduction. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp.136-137 
69 Corrigan, Oonagh, (2009) ‘Genetics and Social Theory’ in Turner, Bryan S. (eds) The New Blackwell 
Companion to Social Theory. (Blackwell Publishing Ltd): p.350 
70 Yeung, Karen (2018) Genome editing and human reproduction: social and ethical issues. Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics. 
71 ibid. pp.71-72 
72 ibid. p.68; As noted by one of the referees, the common portrayal of Habermas and Sandel as outlined in this 
paper and as criticised by Corrigan, Yeung and others, is not necessarily the only portrayal. For the purposes of 
this paper, I will keep to the common portrayal.   
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the lacuna of such a basic ‘genetic-social environmental co-creation’ premise likely continues 
to imbalance the discussions on enhancement and the subsequent ethical conclusions. 
 
Given the well-established and fundamental nature of this genetic-environmental co-
creation, it begs the question why this scientific frame is replaced with an effective genetic 
essentialist frame when one moves to the normative context, and why it is so resilient. In 
addition to normative responses most likely not being appropriate nor proportionate 
(ultimately, ‘not fit for purpose’), there is the issue of a lack of responsibility where this 
approach risks exploiting “the public's worst fears and perpetuates misunderstandings 
concerning basic human biology and genetics”.73 This could (and likely does) give rise to a 
vicious circle where normative objections to misperceptions of genetic science contributes to 
the basis for further normative objections and further public concerns. In fairness to the 
normative literature, Corrigan reports how this is a much wider cultural phenomenon where 
the gene has become a powerful icon.74 She also highlights how exaggerated claims by 
scientists themselves as well as the media play significant roles.75 This is not to say that the 
social sciences have not been giving longstanding attention to the biological and genetic 
sciences and potential developments in genetic modification. Sociologists have, for instance, 
been concerned that genetics could serve to legitimate existing unjust social arrangements or 
that the genetics of behaviour is a eugenicist project in disguise.76 Nevertheless, as Freese 
(2008) notes, the accumulating evidence from genetics suggests many individual-level 
outcomes of sociological interest are genetically influenced to a substantial, but not 
determinist, degree.77 Freese and Shostak (2009) note that while social science and genetic 
science have fairly little engagement with each other, there are emerging developments that 
 
73 Resnik, D & Vorhaus D (2006) ‘Genetic modification and genetic determinism’ Philosophy, Ethics, and 
Humanities in Medicine 1:9 
74 Corrigan, Oonagh, (2009) ‘Genetics and Social Theory’ in Turner, Bryan S. (eds) The New Blackwell 
Companion to Social Theory. (Blackwell Publishing Ltd): p.350 
75 Corrigan, Oonagh, (2009) ‘Genetics and Social Theory’ in Turner, Bryan S. (eds) The New Blackwell 
Companion to Social Theory. (Blackwell Publishing Ltd): p.350 
76 Bearman, P (2008) ‘Introduction: Exploring Genetics and Social Structure’ in Bearman, P (ed) Exploring 
Genetics and Social Structure special issue, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 114, Supplement 2008.  
77 Freese, J (2008) ‘Genetics and the Social Science Explanation of Individual Outcomes’ in Bearman, P (ed) 




can create a larger space for genetic and social scientists to incorporate each other’s insights 
without a sense of capitulation to the other.78  
 
It is also not to say that ethicists or moral or legal philosophers developing the normative 
literature should be replaced by sociologists or social scientists. However, in positing what 
should, or should not, be requires one to know better what is, of which effects of social 
structures are central. A greater dialogue is required between normative theorists and social 
scientists, as well as genetic scientists, in order to first identify the empirical basis to many 
assumptions that then inform the subsequent normative reflections and discussions. It is at 





In dealing with future technologies and future societies, anticipatory bioethics and 
speculation is needed and can fruitfully lead to an identification of the ELS issues that may 
arise and what subsequent responses might be required.  But this speculation can be better 
framed (and some potential scenarios, futures and technical consequences already dismissed 
as idle fantasy) by being better underpinned with more robust empirical assumptions than is 
done in many cases. The notion of ‘responsible speculation’ is relevant here due to the fast-
evolving scientific developments and the pressing issue of developing adequate ELSI 
responses.  As was particularly evident in the context of ‘incidental enhancements’, this 
speculation must be done with a greater sense of responsibility for how it may drive current 
discussions, attitudes and policy approaches with regard to emerging gene editing scenarios 
 
78 Freese, Jeremy & Shostak, Sara (2009) ‘Genetics and Social Inquiry’ Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 
35:107-128 (August 2009). 
79 While this paper had the more modest, yet worthwhile, goal of highlighting the persistence of this genetic 
essentialist framing in CRISPR-Cas9 discussions, there are some indications of an emerging alternative 
(sociologically-informed) framework taking formation. Some examples of this promising work can be seen in 
Owens (2013) ‘Towards a New Sociology of Genetics and Human Identity’; Hauskeller, Sturdy, and Tutton 
(2013) Genetics and the Sociology of Identity; Tamir (2016) ‘Postnatal Human Genetic Enhancement – A 
Consideration of Children’s Right to Be Genetically Enhanced’, Frontiers in Sociology; Laura Yenisa Cabrera 
(2017) ‘Reframing Human enhancement: A Population Health Perspective’, Frontiers in sociology. Also see: 
Garrison, Nanibaa' A., Brothers, Kyle B., Goldenberg, Aaron J. & Lynch, John A. (2019) ‘Genomic 




with real world medical and societal consequences. Resnik & Vorhaus had noted that the day 
was coming when such genetic discussions move outside the world of academia and into the 
world of public policy and political decision-making.80 At this point, they continued, there will 
be a “need for well-reasoned scientific policy [that] cannot be built on logical or biological 
errors and misunderstandings”.81 Given the rapid post-CRISPR advances in progress, this day 
appears to have come. To this end, there is an urgent need for an alternative ‘default’ framing 
giving greater role for sociological input (i.e. the pervasive effects of social structures) into the 
normative debates on genome editing, as particularly notable in the enhancement myth, for 
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